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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Military Service-Judicial Review of Draft Classification
A Pennsylvania Quaker named Palmer was a member of a religious
study group in California when he became subject to the Selective Service Act of 1948.1 He wrote his California local board that his religious
opposition to war was so total that he could not with conscience submit
himself to military jurisdiction-not even to the extent of registering
with the civilian selective service authorities. 2 Nothing happened.
Upon returning to Pennsylvania in 1950, Palmer wrote the California
board of his change of address; he also wrote his local board in Pennsyl3
vania of his presence there, stating his views on refusal to register.
Shortly afterward, the Pennsylvania local board wrote Palmer to come
to discuss the matter. He replied that he was aware of a regulation
permitting him to be registered on the basis of information gained from
an interview, without his signing the registration form ;4 therefore he
declined to be interviewed. As a result, Palmer was convicted of the
crime of refusal to register, and served a year and a day in federal prison.
Under a regulation making prison wardens draft registrars of inmates
never previously registered, Palmer was registered against his will the
day he left prison and the form was forwarded to his Pennsyliania
board.6 The board sent Palmer in December, 1951, the standard classi162 STAT. 604 (1948) (later amended by 65 STAT. 75 (1951), 50 U. S. C. App.
§§ 451-73 (1952), as amended, 50 U S. C. A. ApP. §§ 454, 454a, 454c-54e, 456, 459,
467 (Supp. August 1955)). The 1951 amendment changed the name of the act
to Universal Military Training and Service Act.
' The Society of Friends has made the following statements as a result of
official meetings: "We believe that every young man who, under a sense of religious
compulsion, feels that he must refuse to comply with the Draft Law, at any point,
should follow the supreme authority of his inner guide."

Also: ".

.

. Friends are

urged ...to support Young Friends and others who express their opposition to
conscription either by non-registration, or by registration as conscientious objectors .

. .

. Nevertheless, we hold in respect and sympathetic understanding

all those men who in good conscience choose to enter the armed forces." United
States v. Palmer, 122 F. Supp. 938, 941, n. 7 (E. D. Pa. 1954). Cf. Gara v.
United States, 178 F. 2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), affd by an equally divided court
340 U. S.857, rehearing denied 340 U. S. 893 (1950) (defendant was convicted of
knowingly counseling and aiding and abetting another to refuse or evade registration).
' Palmer wrote that he was "a Quaker and a Christian pacifist." "[I] feel that
I should inform you of my presence in the area of your jurisdiction, in case any
inquiries should be made on my case, or any action is desired to be taken against
me." United States v. Palmer, 223 F. 2d 893, 903 (3d Cir. 1955) (appendix to
opinions).
'32 C. F. R. § 1613.13 (c) (1954).
32 C. F. R. §§ 1611.6, 1613A1 (a) (1954).
32 C. F. R.§ 1613.41 (d) (1954). In the light of § 1642.31, however, it would
seem §§ 1611.6 and 1613.41 were primarily intended to apply to those who were in
prison when they first became subject to registration. Section 1642.31 provides for
more than mere registration; it requires also the filling out of all forms (including
the special one for conscientious objectors) and permits a physical examination
to be given. This is to be done when the prisoner is first taken into custody. If
a man will not sign the forms, the warden may sign for him. Had this procedure
been followed, Palmer might have been spared later grief. But see § 1642.3 (compliance with any or all the procedures of Part 1642 not a condition procedent to
prosecution).
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questionnaire, 7

fication
which was forwarded from his home address to
him in Oberlin, Ohio, where he was a student in the Graduate School
of Theology of Oberlin College. The next day after receiving the
questionnaire, Palmer returned it unexecuted but with an accompanying
letter informing the board of his student status. He said in the letter
that his refusal to execute the questionnaire was but a continuation of
his prior refusal to register;8 that he was sorry to hamper the board
members in doing what they conceived to be their duty.0 Since one of
the items on the questionnaire concerned religious beliefs, he also enclosed a lengthy "court statement" that he had made during his trial
for refusal to register concerning the exact nature of his religious beliefs. Two days after Palmer mailed this letter, the Dean of the Graduate School of Theology at Oberlin wrote the local board to clarify
Palmer's selective service status.' 0 The Dean said that Palmer was a
first year student who had entered the school on a competitive scholarship, and that he was taking a full time regular course."t
In January, 1952, the board ordered Palmer to report on February
15 for a pre-induction physical examination. On February 12, however,
the board on its own motion sent him the special classification form for
conscientious objectors. 12 Yet on February 14, without waiting for the
return of the new form or to see if he would report for the physical
examination, the board classified Palmer I-A. 13 He did not, of course,
report for the examination; instead, that day he mailed to the board
his conscientious objector questionnaire unexecuted but with another
accompanying letter. The letter answered substantially every item of
SSS Form No. 100. See 32 C. F. R. § 1621.9 (1954).
States v. Palmer, 223 F. 2d 893, 895,

8United

897 (3d Cir. 1955) (both ma-

jority and dissent agreed that failure to register and failure to report for induction were separate crimes).

'Id. at 904 (appendix to opinions) : "Please understand that this was not, and

is not, intended personally, that I sympathize with your desire to follow the regulations which you are set up to enforce. I do not intend by my actions any criticism
whatever of you in your position."
032 C. F. R. § 1621.12 (b) (1954) : "Any person other than the registrant may
request the deferment of a registrant by filing such request in writing with the

local board together with any information in support of his request... " This section is probably not applicable, however, because the Dean did not label his letter
as a request. But cf. United States v. Vincelli, 215 F. 2d 210, rehearing dcnied 216
F. 2d 681 (2d Cir. 1954) (board should have known from context of letter that
"appeal" meant request that classification be re-opened rather than an actual
appeal).
1162 STAT. 611 (1948), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (g) (1952), grants
-full time students in recognized theological schools a full exemption from training
and1 2service.
SSS Form No. 150. See 32 C. F. R. § 1621.11 (1954).
' 32 C. F. R. § 1622.1 (c) (1954) : ". . . registrant will be considered as
available for military service until his eligibility for deferment or exemption from
military service is clearly established . . . " Section 1623.1 (b) : ". . . and in the
absence of any other information, when the registrant has failed to furnish such
information within the time prescribed, [board has the power] to classify the
registrant as available for military service."
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information required on the official form,1 4 referring to the "court statement" previously submitted as containing the necessary detailed statement of his religious concepts. 15
In April he was again ordered to report for a physical examination;the order was ignored. In May he was ordered to report for induction into the armed services; Palmer failed to report. Except
for copies of the board's letters and orders to Palmer and correspondence between the board and the Department of Justice concerning
Palmer's prior criminal status, the above mentioned letters and the
registration form completed by the prison warden 16 comprised the only
7
information in his selective service file.1
The Department of Justice indicted Palmer for refusal to submit to
induction' 8 in compliance with the May order. The district court convicted; on appeal, the court of appeals sitting en banc affirmed' 9 the
conviction in a four-to-three decision. 20 The United States Supreme
21
Court denied Palmer's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Before discussing the reasoning of the opinions in this case, it is
helpful to investigate some of the legal background having a bearing
on the decisions reached. World War I draft cases established that no
one has any constitutional right to exemption from the draft.22 Exemptions, whether for public officials, factory workers, ministers of religion, or conscientious objectors, are purely a matter of legislative
grace. As a practical matter, exemptions have always been granted
certain classes; nevertheless Congress may exempt or refuse to exempt
1
1

United States v. Palmer, 122 F. Supp. 938, 939 (E. D. Pa. 1954).
See Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S.375, 378 (1955).

1"

See 32 C. F. R. § 1613.41 (b)

(1954): ".

.

. warden . . . shall be careful

not to indicate that the immate was registered in an institution or by an official
thereof. ..."
17 32 C. F. R. § 1623.1 (b)
(1954) : "The registrant's classification shall be
determined solely on the basis of the official forms of the Selective Service System
and such other written information as may be contained in his file; . . .oral information shall not be considered unless it is summarized in writing and the summary placed in the registrant's file... .
1862 STAT.622 (1948), 50 U. S. C. App.§ 462 (a) (1952).
" United States v. Palmer, 223 F. 2d 893 (3d Cir. 1955), affirming 122 F. Supp.
938 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
0The majority opinion was written by Goodrich, Circuit Judge, iii which concurred Biggs, Chief Judge, and Kalodner and Staley, Circuit Judges. The dissenting opinion was written by Maris, Circuit Judge, in which concurred McLaughlin and Hastie, Circuit Judges.
'1 Palmer v. United States, 350 U. S. 873 (1955).
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918). No cases testing the
constitutionality of conscription reached the U. S. Supreme Court during the Civil
War. Lincoln, speaking of the express constitutional power to raise and support
armies, said this: "The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally. It is
not a power to raise armies if State authorities consent; nor if the men to compose
the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and support armies
given to Congress by the Constitution without an if." George v. United States,
196 F. 2d 445, 455, n. 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 344 U. S.843 (1952).
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whomever it chooses. 23 Congress sold exemptions for three hundred dollars during the Civil War.24 As early as colonial times legislatures have
exempted conscientious objectors from service in the militia.2 i Yet Congress later could validly require civilian or non-combatant military service from the conscientious objector rather than grant a complete ex26
emption.
Congress may also forclose judicial review of any draft classification.2 The current Universal Military Training and Service Act, like
the acts of 1917 and 1940, makes classification by the local board
"final," subject to appeal within the selective service system; and where
28
there is an appeal, the classification resulting from this is "final" too.
The object of Congress in providing for this administrative finality is to
prevent any court action from impeding swift and steady conscription
during wartime or any time of emergency." This object is legitimate
under the war powers of the Constitution of the United States; with
the power existing, it may be exercised in peacetime in contemplation of
any future emergency 30
Nevertheless, the federal courts have not completely given up their
power to aid draft registrants deprived of substantial due process by the
selective service authorities. The Selective Draft Act of 191731 was construed to allow federal courts to review by writ of habeas corpus the
draft status of those who claimed that they had been illegally drafted.
The theory used was analogous to that employed by the courts in granting habeas corpus writs to aliens under deportation orders and to military prisoners whose court martial had lacked jurisdiction. 82 Under
the 1917 Act the registrant became subject to military law immediately
upon receiving his notice to report; failure to report was the offense of
23 United States v. Sugar, 243 Fed. 423, 429-30 (E. D. Mich. 1917) (exemption
of certain classes from military service does not make conscription laws invalid
as class legislation).

2 Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition it the United
States, 20 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 409, 418 (1952).
2 Russell, supra note 24, at 412-14.
The conscientious objector, however,

often had to provide a substitute or pay a commutation fee.

" The 1863-64 Act provided for either noncombatant service or payment of
the commutation fee; the 1917 Act provided for noncombatant service; the 1940
Act provided for either noncombatant service or civilian work of national importance; the 1948 Act (during peacetime) granted complete exemption, but the
1951 amendment substantially restored the provisions of the 1940 Act. Russell,
supra note 24, at 418-28.
2 Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
2862 STAT. 620 (1948), as amended 50 U. S. C. APP. § 460 (b) (3) (1952).
.' Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944).
20United States v. Henderson, 180 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 339
U. 2140
S. 963,
rehearing denied 340 U. S. 846 (1950).
STAT. 76 (1917).
22 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955) ; cf. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48 (1955) ; Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F. R. D. 411, 433-39 (1954).
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desertion, to be tried before a military court.8 3 Although the temper
of the times had infected even the judiciary to the extent that it was
generally futile to ask for a writ of habeas corpus, the registrant was
able to do so immediately upon being subjected to military jurisdiction
by receipt of the notice to report.3 4
The Selective Service and Training Act of 194035 changed procedure,
however. Military jurisdiction did not attach until the actual induction.36 Failure to report for or submit to induction was made a felony
to be tried in the federal courts. The first cases, though, tended to apply
the World War I precedents; it was generally held no defense to this
newly created crime that the classification and resulting induction order
may have been issued contrary to the regulations. 37 Congress had said
the classification by the selective service authorities was final, and the
courts interpreted this to mean that the registrant must first be inducted
and then ask for a writ of habeas corpus before any sort of judicial review was possible.38
The United States Supreme Court did not treat the issue of invalidity of classification and the resultant induction order raised as a
defense in the criminal trial until 1944 in Falbo v. United States.3 9
Falbo contended that as a Jehovah's Witness he was a minister; he disputed his classification as a conscientious objector, and refused to report
to the civilian public service camp to do work of national importance. At
the time Falbo was ordered to report, he might have been rejected either
at a military induction center or at a work camp as the result of his
physical examination; the order to report was not the last possible step
in the draft process. Stress was laid upon the "connected series of
steps" ' 40 contemplated by the statute which was not to be broken by any
The 1917 Act said those
'"Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1918).
lawfully classified became subject to military jurisdiction upon receipt of the draft
notice. The court did not investigate the merits of the classification; the only
question was whether the military had gained jurisdiction through lawful classification procedure on the part of the draft authorities.
" See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542, 546 (1944); United States ex rel.

Feld v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 704 (2d Cir. 1923) (notice language in the latter case

at page 710 as to "waiver" resulting from failure to claim exemption).
"54 S'AT.885 (1940).
"Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S.542 (1944).
'7 See Ex parte Catanzaro, 138 F. 2d 100 (3d Cir. 1943) cert. denied 321 U. S.
793 (1944).
"See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S.542 (1944) (registrant at induction center
refused to take oath; oath was read to him; held, the military did not acquire
jurisdiction). But see Russell, supra note 24, at 424, n. 65, saying regulations
were changed shortly after this case to circumvent that result. Quaere whether
voluntary submission to induction would be a waiver of the right to challenge the

validity of the draft classification; cf. Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S.338

(1946) (involved reporting to civilian camp rather than military center and
the Government claimed waiver).

"320 U. S.549 (1944).
"Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S.549, 553 (1944).
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"litigious interruption" ;41 there was to be no "judicial intervention
before final acceptance" 42 of the registrant. The Court said that even
if the defense of invalidity were admissible, Falbo's refusal to obey had
been premature and was a failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The case did not specify how far the registrant would have to go to
exhaust his remedies. However, this case was universally interpreted
by the lower federal courts as holding that the registrant would have to
go at least as far as submitting to induction and that the only possible
judicial review of a draft classification could be by writ of habeas corpus
43
after induction.
Then in 1946, the war being over, Estep v. United States4 4 announced a doctrine permitting review of the draft classification upon the
felony trial. Mentioning that the defendants had pursued their administrative remedies to the point of going to the induction center (but
refusing to be sworn in), the Court held that it was proper to consider
whether the local board had had jurisdiction in the premises. 45 Saying
that the writ of habeas corpus would be available to the defendant in
jail after conviction because of the invalidity of all subsequent proceedings stemming from an invalid classification, the majority thought it
would be foolish to put a man in jail one day only to have to let him
out the next.46 The test announced was this: "The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for
the classification which it gave the registrant."' 47
Subsequent cases have refined the rule permitting this limited judicial
review. When the regulations were changed to provide for pre-induction
physical examinations, the Court found it was no longer necessary to
report to the induction center to exhaust administrative remedies. 48
United States, 320 U. S. 549, 554 (1944).
"
Falbo
"Id.
at v.
554.
"United States v. Flakowicz, 146 F. 2d 874 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 325
U. S.851 (1945) ; Rinko v. United States, 147 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 325
U. S. 851, rehearing denied 325 U. S. 894 (1945) ; cf. Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S.
174 (1947) ; Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338 (1946).
"327 U. S.114 (1946).

"The Court said that Falbo v. United States, supra note 39, had been
construed to mean more than it had actually held.
"'Butsee Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S.174 (1947) (defendants who had exhausted

their administrative remedies and were convicted under the "erroneous" view of
Falbo v. United States, supra note 39, yet were denied habeas corpus because

they had not appealed--despite the fact that an appeal seemed absolutely futile at
the hEstep
time). v. United States, 327 U. S.114, 122-23 (1946). This "basis in fact"

test of jurisdiction seems broader than that applied in some of the wartime habeas
corpus cases, which did not review facts but merely looked to see if procedural opportunity to a hearing had been afforded the registrant. Moreover the registrant
carries a greater burden of proof in the habeas corpus proceedings; since Estep v.
United States, supra, the remedy has been little used. See Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 So. CALWF. L. REV. 123, 134 (1955).
" Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S.338 (1946).
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The Court soon held that whether or not the local board had any "basis
in fact" for making the classification was a matter of law for the judge,
rather than a jury, to determine. 49 In reviewing the classification, the
court may not review additional evidence not considered by the local
board and made part of the registrant's file. 50 But where all the evidence
in the file supports the registrant's claim, the board may not deny the
classification "solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation" ;51 the
board must have affirmative evidence in the file showing why it disbelieves the claim.52 The more recent cases have stressed procedural
due process, requiring local boards and appeal boards to give the registrant notice of any adverse information so that he may rebut it.53 Where
a local board failed to notify the registrant that it had declined to re-open
his classification as requested and kept him in the same category, it was
held that this deprived him of procedural rights.54 And the "basis in
fact" test has been broadened to the extent that convictions have been
reversed where, even though the board may have had some factual basis
40 Cox v. United States, 332 U. S. 442 (1947).
But even where the court finds
some basis in fact for the classification, the jury may determine whether the board
had acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Imboden v. United States, 194 F. 2d 508
(6th Cir.), cert. denied 343 U. S.957 (1952).
0 Cox v. United States, 332 U. S. 442 (1947).
1 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S. 389, 397 (1953).
"2Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S. 389 (1953). The board here was
determining the "objective fact" whether or not the registrant was a regular or
duly ordained minister. Conscientious objection, however, is a matter of personal
belief and the board's decision necessarily rests in part upon the appearance and
conduct of the registrant and the credibility of his claim-whether contradicted or
not. Because of this personal element, the appeal procedure for a conscientious
objector is different from that for all others, with an F. B. I. report being a
standard feature. The courts, though, seem to require the affirmative evidence in
conscientous objector cases as well as any others, perhaps mainly so that the
courts will have a written record to review.
Weaver v. United States, 210
F. 2d 815 (8th Cir. 1954). But see Campbell v. United States, 221 F. 2d 454
(4th Cir. 1955) (relying in part on United States v. Simmons, 213 F. 2d 901 (7th
Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds 348 U. S.397 (1955)). It has been suggested
the board might satisfy the affirmative evidence requirement merely by indicating
in the file its unfavorable reaction to the registrant's behavior or demeanor or to
certain inconsistencies of the evidence supporting his claim. Witmer v. United
States, 348 U. S. 375, 382 (1955); United States v. Hagaman, 213 F. 2d 86,
89 (3d Cir. 1954).
0" Gonzales v. United States, 348 U. S.407 (1955) ; Simmons v. United States,
348 U. S.397 (1955) ; United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S. 1 (1953) (registrant
had no right to see the adverse information contained in confidential F. B. I. reports, but that he did have the right to a "fair r~sum"). Problems have arisen
as to whether the r~sum6 given was a fair one; thus one court ordered the report
into evidence (ith names deleted) for the purpose of comparison. United States
v. Stasevic, 117 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. N. Y. 1953), rev'd on other grounds su nor
United States v. Vincelli, 215 F. 2d 210, rehearing denied 216 F. 2d 681 (2d Cir.
1954).
" United States v. Vincelli, 215 F. 2d 210, rehearinq dentied 216 F. 2d 681
(2d Cir. 1954) (there was strong basis in fact for disbelieving the claim, but the
procedural error was held to warrant acquittal). But cf. Campbell v. United
States, 221 F. 2d 454, 458 (4th Cir. 1955) (held board was justified in refusing
to re-open classification under parallel regulation).
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for denying the claim, it appeared the selective service authorities acted
upon mistaken assumptions of law. 55
It would seem clear that the courts have greatly relaxed much of
the former strictness shown in reviewing draft classifications."0 Nevertheless there are still only two ways in which the registrant may obtain
this judicial review: (1) submit to induction and apply for a writ of
habeas corpus; (2) refuse to submit and raise the defense of invalid
classification in the felony trial.
In the principal case of United States v. PalIner 7
the four-to-three
split of opinion emphasizes the growing inclination of the courts to
broaden the scope of their review. The dissenting opinion could cite no
holdings really in point, but relied upon tendencies found in series of
cases or upon analogous decisionsY8 The majority did cite a case which
had bare facts more or less similar to those here, but there was at least
a vast psychological difference between the two cases.5 9
The majority thought that it seemed somewhat strange to talk of
exhausting administrative remedies since Palmer had not availed himself of any at all, and expressly affirmed the conviction upon policy
grounds reminiscent of the Falbo decision. (The district court had held
the exhaustion of remedies the controlling factor.) Whether the local
board's classification was arbitrary or illegal was an issue not reached
under this disposition. Instead, the majority spoke of the vital importance of a procedure for the efficient and orderly conscription of
millions of men, and that no one man may set himself above the necessary and reasonable procedures of the selective service system.60
"Annett v. United States, 205 F. 2d 689 (10th Cir. 1953); cf. Sicurella v.
United States, 348 U. S. 385 (1955) (selective service authorities thought as a
matter of law a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses could not be a conscientious
objector because of their belief in self defense and "theocratic wars"; held: Congress had meant present day wars fought with real bullets).
" Shipley, Conscientious Objection: A Problem of Proof, 25 OKLA. B. A. J.
1596 (1954).
"223 F. 2d 893 (3d Cir. 1955), afflrming 122 F. Supp. 938 (E. D. Pa. 1954),
cert. denied 350 U. S. 873 (1955).
"See Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E. D. Pa. 1952) (registrant was
permitted judicial review by writ of habeas corpus although under no restraint;
"constructive custody" theory applied).
" Doty v. United States, 218 F. 2d 93 (8th Cir. 1955). Doty and his three
brothers were convicted of refusal to register; out of prison on parole, the Doty
brothers ignored the correspondence from the local board. Doty wrote the board
only once, saying they were "not subject to whims of the local board" since they
were on parole. Doty's form filled out by the warden gave his occupation as
"rail"--meaning locomotive fireman. Shortly before Doty reached his 26th birthday, the board deferred him as a "locomotive engineer." The granting of this
temporary deferment rendered Doty subject to the draft for nine more years,
until the age of 35. Doty claimed the board was "acting out of pique." The
board then classified Doty and his brothers all I-A and ordered them to submit
to induction. In affirming the conviction, the court mentioned, among other things,
that the Doty brothers had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
" "There were on June 30, 1954, about fifteen and a half million young men
registered . . . [with] boards . . . composed of citizens only some of whom are
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The dissenting judges thought the affirming of the conviction exalted
form above substance, pointing out that Palmer did in fact supply the
board with enough information to have received one of several classifications lower than I-A. 6" Since he was a ministerial student, he would
have been properly placed in Class IV-D (complete exemption)62 or
Class I-S (student deferment until end of academic year).O Since he
had served more than a year in prison, the board could, in its discretion,
have placed him in Class IV-F (complete deferment; physically, mentally, or morally unfit) .64 Since he was a complete conscientious objector, he could have been placed in Class I-0 (available for civilian
work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety or interest) 65 or, failing that, Class I-A-O (induction into the military service
as a noncombatant)."
The dissenting opinion indicated that the classification by the local
board was positively illegal, since the regulations required the board in
classifying to "receive and consider" 67 all pertinent information submitted-both that on the official forms and "other written information"er 6
in the file. The dissent thought that the exclusion of remedies doctrine
lawyers and all of whom serve without pay.. .. It... demands a high degree
of co-operation from everyone involved .... No man has a constitutional right
to be free from a call to military service .... However, a sympathetic Congress,
desirous to afford a maximum of freedom of conscience, has provided for [exemptions and deferments]. It has also provided for a rather elaborate machinery
for appeal .... If rules must be laid down for the handling of court business,
as they are, and the proceedings of administrative bodies, as they are, there is
even greater reason for the establishment of orderly procedure with nearly four
thousand volunteer boards handling the cases of more than fifteen million young
men .... It would only be a step further for this or some other young man to
say that he is so much against war that he will not pay taxes to a government
which spends the majority of its income to maintain a military establishment. It
is only one step further ...

to say ...

that he feels no moral obligation to obey

anything [the government] says.. . . In other words, he wants this department
of the government run his way. . . . We do not say for a moment that this
defendant is like the rat-like characters who so often come into criminal courts.
He may be the prophet of a new day or he may be more dangerous than some
of the rat-like characters because his type of refusal to co-operate, if sufficiently
widespread, would make organized society impossible." United States v. Palmer,
223 F. 2d 893, 895-97 (3d Cir. 1955) ; cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the University
of Cal., 293 U. S. 245, 265-68 (1934) (concurring opinion of Cardozo, J.).
" A person with grounds for more than one classification is to be placed in the
lowest one. 32 C. F. R. § 1623.2 (1954).
G 32 C. F. R. § 1622.43 (a) (3) (1954).
oB32 C. F. R. § 1622.15 (b) (1954). Palmer was ordered to report May 20,
1952; this was shortly before the end of his academic year.
,32 C. F. R. § 1622.44 (c) (1954). But it would be strange to say that one
of Palmer's moral fibre is morally unfit because of the prison sentence.
32 C. F. R. § 1622.14 (1954).
-032 C. F. R. § 1622.11 (1954). But it is hardly likely that Palmer would
have submitted to noncombatant service-or even civilian service under the aegis
of the selective service.
'32 C. F. R. § 1622.1 (c) (1954).
as 32 C. F. R. § 1623.1 (b) (1954). But see § 1621.12 (a) (anyone asking for
a deferment must present written information to be "included in or attached to"
the official form).
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should be relaxed in hardship cases, but did not really apply here. In
support of this thesis, it pointed out-that in the Falbo case the language
as to the exhaustion doctrine had been applied to the situation where
further possible remedies were open to the registrant at the time the
order had been disobeyed. 69 Yet by the time Palmer refused to obey
the order the classification had become final and unappealable within
the selective service system, thereby making Palmer's case ripe for
judicial review. 70
Both the majority and dissent in the principal case are persuasive. 71
They illuminate problems of construing the Universial Military Training and Service Act72 that will continue to perplex the courts. Congress
adopted the basic act in 1948 during peacetime, retaining substantially
the same language as that in the 1940 Act as to the finality of classification by the draft authorities. The legislative history shows this was
expressly done so that the Falbo and Estep doctrines of limited court
review would continue to apply. 73
The 1951 amendments, enacted during the Korean War, changed the
name of the act from "selective" to "universal"; also, conscientious objectors were deprived of the complete exemption granted in 1948 and
the "work or fight" provision was restored. 4 On the basis of legislative
intent it might seem that Congress meant for courts to interfere only to
a very limited extent with the selective service machinery-machinery
to be kept in readiness for high speed functioning without any clogs or
obstructions. Although the 1951 amendments did not change the
language relating to administrative finality, at that time Falbo and Estep
were still substantially unmodified." It was only later that the crop of
Korean War cases began reaching the appellate level with the result that
76
inroads were made upon the original strict doctrine.
Viewed as a matter of policy, apart from any assumed Congressional
" But the language used by the Court there and in succeeding decisions was
broad enough (and often harsh enough) to include a case of this type.
7o 32 C. F. R. § 1641.2 (b) (1954) (waiver of rights not exercised). The
limited right of appeal for special reasons after the expiration of the time limit
exists only until the order to report for induction is mailed. 32 C. F. R. § 1626.2
(d) (1954). The same is true of the right to request that the classification be
re-opened. 32 C. F. R § 1625.2 (Supp. 1955).
' It should be repeated that the majority opinion did not affirm on the technical
basis of the exhaustion of remedies rule but rather for pure policy reasons. The
dissent, on the other hand, used "legal" reasoning in determining that Palmer
should not have been convicted.
7'62 STAT. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 451-73 (1952), as
amended, 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§ 454, 454a, 454c-54e, 456, 459, 467 (Supp. August
1955).
S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2008 (1948).
7'65 STAT. 86 (1951), 50 U. S. C. Ap. § 456 (j) (1952).
SE.g., Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S. 389 (1953) (note date; settled
that boards must "build" a record for review).
"For example, the principal case was no finally decided until 1955, although
Palmer's refusal to report was in May, 1952.
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intent,77 there would seem to be some need for court review on an expanded basis. Court opinions are carefully read in the Department of
Justice, which plays a major part in the draft process. 78 This unquestionably has had the effect of reducing arbitrary decisions and potential
administrative tyranny.7 9 Even under emergency conditions the concept of certain minimum standards of due process and fair dealing, for
the nonconformist as well as the conformist, forms a part of our tradition of liberty.80
LEWIS POINDEXTER WATTS, JR.

Operation of Pathological and X-Ray Facilities by Charitable
Hospital as Corporate Practice of Medicine
A decision' of national significance was recently handed down by the
district court of Iowa in an action involving the right of 170 hospitals,
which comprise plaintiff-Iowa Hospital Association, to continue to
operate pathology and X-ray laboratories and collect for these services
from patients. 2 The court ruled that the hospitals, in purveying these
services to patients, were illegally engaged in the practice of medicine.
" 62 STAT. 620 (1948), as amended 50 U. S. C. Ap'. § 460 (b) (3) (1952), has
not been changed insofar as it relates to administrative finality; yet Congress has
amended or added several sections to the act, e.g., 1955 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, Act of June 30, 1955, c. 250, 69 STAT.
223 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U. S. C. App.). Note also 69 STAT.
602 (1955), 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§ 454 (d) (3), 456 (c) (2), (d) (1)-(2)
(Supp. August 1955).
"8Shipley, Conscientious Objection--A Legal Right, 13 FED. B. J. 282, 286
(1953) (Mr. Shipley is listed as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General of
the United States).
" Cf. United States v. Hagaman, 312 F. 2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1954): "[I]n recent months Courts of Appeals have had to consider a whole series of rather
similar cases where unexplained orders of the national board changing the classification of Jehovah's Witnesses from 1-0 to 1-A make sense only if they repreent a consistent administrative application of this understandable, if mistaken,
legal theory [that Jehovah's Witnesses are as a matter of law not conscientious
objectors because of their belief in 'theocratic war']." See note 55 supra.
Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 So. CALIF. L. REy.
123, 135-36 & nn. 38-39 (1955), tells of the use of suspended sentences to prevent
injustice. The District Court suspended Palmer's sentence rather than send him
to prison a second time. Tietz mentions that one Jehovah's Witness has been
prosecuted four times.
so See Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 555-61 (1944) (dissenting opinion
of Murphy, J.).

Iowa Hospital Association, et al., v. Iowa State Board of Medical Examiners;
et. al, Iowa State Medical Society, Intervenor, an unreported decision of the
District Court, Ninth Judicial District of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, No. 63095,
Equity, decided 28 Nov., 1955.
2 Plaintiffs, because of a ruling of the Attorney General of Iowa dated 19
February, 1954, to the effect that operation by hospitals of laboratory and X-ray
facilities, with billing of the patients by the hospitals, violated the Iowa Medical
Practice Acts (Iowa Code, ch. 147), sought a declaratory judgment. In addition
to the defendant and intervenor, the suit was defended by the Attorney General
of Iowa.

